Abstract-Online social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, Youtube) 
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) provide a popular, cost-effective and scalable framework for sharing user-generated contents (e.g. knowledge, photos, videos, news). Well known functions and examples of OSNs include social interactions on Facebook and MySpace, file sharing on YouTube and Flickr, messaging and exchanging on Twitter, and professional networking on LinkedIn. Due to their popularity, OSNs have the potential to fundamentally change our social lives [1] [2] [3] .
Creating and dissolving links to share knowledge and contents is a key feature of OSN services. A user's ability to visualize and traverse his own connections and the connections of others (such as friends and friends of friends) is a defining feature of many OSNs [5] . Typical examples of link creation include "send friend request" on Facebook, "add to circle" on Google+, "follow" on Twitter, and "subscribe" on YouTube. Tremendous efforts have been dedicated in recent years to analyzing and describing the emerging social interactions among users as well as to understanding why certain connectivity pattern emerges in the network [3] - [7] . For instance, [3] reveals that the empirical probability of users who are followed by very large numbers of users on Twitter is above what a scale-free distribution would predict, while the relation of "following" is reciprocated in only around 22% of the cases. Meanwhile, [4] shows that ties on Twitter also exhibit high directed closure: a user will be followed by the followers of his followers with a high probability. The work of [6] records network evolution on Flickr and Yahoo! 360. It shows that a large fraction of the individuals are either isolated singletons or form part of small components. Similarly, empirical studies have been performed in [7] on the formation of friendship links on a music sharing site, which suggests that the formation of friendship ties is consistent with users' rational linking choices.
These empirical findings have also attracted the attention of theoretical microeconomics researchers [8] , who focus on how the users' self-interests leads to strategic link creation among the users in an network and analyze the network topologies that arise out of purposeful individual actions. A simple model is analyzed in [9] , where the problem of network formation on OSNs is formulated as a noncooperative game among n strategic users. The link creation actions are available to each user who aims to individually maximize his own utility by trading off the potential rewards obtained by forming a link (e.g. acquired contents) against the incurred link creation cost (e.g. payment and maintenance cost). The link formation is unilateral: a user i can decide to connect with any user j by paying for the link.
Analysis of this model predicts the emergence of resulting "equilibrium" topologies, such as circles, stars, and variants of the star. This model also has been extended in a number of directions. For example, [10] studies the network formation problem when users are heterogeneous, where the costs and benefits of a link depends on the users it connects. It shows that a strict equilibrium network is minimal and conversely every minimal network is a strict equilibrium for suitable costs and benefits. [11] and [12] consider indirect content transmission, where users can access not only contents from friends (i.e. users directly connected via links), but also contents from friends of friends. They prove that if the benefit brought by contents is decaying in distance from the content source to the destination, users have incentive to get close to others. Meanwhile, the incremental value of contents falls as users acquire more contents. These findings result in small world networks [13] supported by a few links created by a great many people but pointing to only a few key users (the "influencers").
As in [9] , our work also employs a non-cooperative one-shot game formulation to analyze the network formation in OSNs. However, different from previous works which assume that users are endowed with exogenous amounts of contents and only focus on the strategic aspect of link creation [9] [10], our model explicitly considers the incentives of users to produce contents personally. The strategic connection between content production and link creation is also studied in the idealized work in [14] , where the authors find that a phenomenon called "the law of the few" emerges as the result of strategic interactions among users. That is, in every strict equilibrium of the game, the network has a core-periphery architecture: the users in the core produce contents personally while the peripheral users produce no content personally but form links and get all their contents from the core users. Moreover, the population of the core users is upper-bounded which increase at a slower pace than the growth of the social group.
Nevertheless, [14] assumes that for each user, contents produced by different users is equally valued and perfectly substitutable, which fails to capture content heterogeneity and users' desire for content diversity that exist in OSNs [15] . That is, a user's benefit from content consumption does not only depends on the total amount of contents he consumes, but also on how many different types of content and what amount of each type he acquires. We explicitly consider such heterogeneity in user-generated contents in our analysis and design by using the model of public goods introduced in [16] .
In contrast to [14] , we show under our model with content heterogeneity, an OSN possesses the following properties:
(1) Equilibrium. When the size (population) of an OSN is sufficiently large, every (strict) noncooperative equilibrium should consist of either a symmetric topology where each user produces the same amount and has the same degree, or a hierarchical topology with all users belonging to either of the two types: influencers who produce large amounts of contents and subscribers who produce small amounts of contents and get most of their contents from influencers. Nevertheless, under content heterogeneity, "the law of the few" disappears in OSNs as the number of influencers grows proportionally with the network size and its fraction in the user population does not diminish to 0. Particularly, we also prove that a star topology can never emerge in any strict equilibrium. Therefore, production is no longer concentrated in a few powerful users but becomes more dispersed in OSNs.
(2) Social Optimum. We prove that the social optimum in an OSN is not necessarily achieved with a star topology as in [14] , but can be achieved in a symmetric topology. To eliminate the efficiency loss between non-cooperative equilibria and the social optimum, we design a pricing scheme by charging for content acquisition and link creation, which align users' incentives to the maximization of social welfare and the social optimum can be achieved at a non-cooperative equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe our basic model of content production and link creation, where the content heterogeneity is explicitly formulated. In Section III, we analyze the non-cooperative equilibria of this model. In Section IV, we analyze the social optimum of this model and propose a pricing scheme to achieve the social optimum at a non-cooperative equilibrium. We conclude in Section V with future research also outlined.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the content sharing in a network where individual users choose to personally produce contents and to form connections with others to acquire the contents which they produce. Examples of such contents are news, photos, expert knowledge, restaurant reviews, job information, political opinions, and etc. We construct an abstract model of content production and link creation in such networks, which we refer to as the production and network formation game (PNF game). The set of strategies of user i is thus denoted by
Let

{ }
denote the production and subscription graphs of an OSN, a strategy profile is ( )
Similarly, we define
as the friend graph of the network. Let
denote the set of user i 's subscriptions and
denote the set of user i 's friends, his degree is thus represented as ( ) ( )
Users in the PNF game benefit from consuming the contents that he can acquire (both from selfproduction and subscriptions). We assume pure local externalities [9] [14]: each user only acquires the contents personally produced by himself and his friends 3 . In other words, a user cannot acquire the contents produced by another user who is more than one hop away from him on the friend graph g . 1 There are also alternative models about a user's linking strategy. For instance, the linking action , ,
could be a real number within the range 0, 1 é ù ê ú ë û instead of being binary, which represents the strength of the link that user i forms with user j .
Most existing works on network formation games assume that for each user, the contents produced by different users are perfectly substitutable in consumption [9] [14], i.e. the total amount of contents that a user consumes fully determines his benefit. In other words, a user's benefit from content consumption will remain unchanged if he reduces his production by a certain amount and acquires the same amount of extra contents from another user, and vice versa. This assumption, however, fails to capture the content heterogeneity and users' interests to consume diverse contents. Hence, instead of assuming perfect substitutability, we use the preference model from [16] to capture the heterogeneity among different classes of contents. Particularly, we assume that each user has certain expertise in producing a particular class of contents and a user i 's benefit from content consumption is given by
. (1) where we use the convention that i x and i -x refer to the production levels of user i and of all users other than i .
measures a user's desire for content diversity. With 1 r < , it is not the total amount of contents consumed but the number of different types of contents acquired and the particular amount of each type that jointly determine a user's benefit from content consumption. A smaller value of r indicates a higher level of users' desire for content diversity. When 1 r  , contents from different users becomes perfect substitutable, which degenerates our model to the model in [14] . For notational convenience, we define ( )
as user i 's perceived amount of contents and
as his marginal benefit of production.
The following constraints are imposed on the benefit function (1):
v  is a twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave function.
is twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and
Proof: Taking the first-order derivative in i x over f , we have that
Taking the second-order derivative, we have that
Both the first and second terms in the RHS of (4) are smaller than 0. Hence, we have We consider a linear cost on content production. That is, each user i consumes a marginal cost of c to produce one unit of contents. Hence, the cost of producing an amount i x is i cx . Creating a link also incurs some fixed cost g , which could be interpreted as the subscription fee that a user submits to the service provider of the network or the maintenance cost to keep a link 4 . The utility of user i is given by his benefit of content consumption minus all costs:
We analyze the case of homogeneous users in that v , c , g , and r are the same for all users. We assume that c a > to ensure the network is socially valuable. For illustration purposes, we also refer to ( ) ( )
as user i 's content utility, which combines the user's benefit from content consumption and cost of content production.
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A. Definition and basic properties
In this section, we formalize the PNF game as a non-cooperative one-shot game. Each user maximizes his own utility given the strategies of others. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a strategy profile ( )
We explicitly consider strict equilibria and hence the inequality in (6) is set to be strict for every user.
In the remainder of this paper, the words "equilibrium" and "strict equilibrium" are used interchangeably without further notice. We first analyze the basic properties of an equilibrium in the PNF game, and then apply the analysis separately to strategy profiles of symmetric production where each user produces the same amount of contents and strategy profiles of asymmetric production where users produce different amounts of contents.
Given the equilibrium definition (6), a user i 's equilibrium production * i
x always satisfies the following inequality:
That is, the marginal benefit of production should equal to the marginal cost, and thus i has no incentive to produce more than
x when his perceived amount of contents is
We first analyze the basic properties of users' behavior on content production and subscription when the network is in equilibrium. This is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.
In any equilibrium ( )
Proof: See Appendix A. ■ Lemma 2 is briefly explained as follows. In an equilibrium profile, each user's strategy is a strict best response to the strategies of others with his utility being maximized. Therefore, it leads to a redundant investment on link creation if there are two users who mutually subscribe to each other. Then, it can be concluded that in equilibrium, there is at most one link existing between a pair of users as shown in Statement (1). In the works [9] [14] where content is perfectly substitutable, a user could choose to produce zero amount of contents in an equilibrium (like in a core-periphery structure) under the condition that he has already acquired a sufficient amount of contents from his friends. However, due to the heterogeneity of contents in our work, Statement (2) proves that a user always produces a positive amount of contents in equilibrium, since the contents he acquires from friends can never fully replace the contents produced by himself.
Lemma 2 provides a lower bound on the production level of an individual user at equilibrium. Due to the concavity of the benefit function and the linear production cost, the following lemma further provides an upper bound. Proof: See Appendix A. ■ Therefore, x serves as a constant upper-bound of the amount that an individual user is willing to produce in any equilibrium.
B. Equilibrium in symmetric production profiles
In this section, we study equilibria in symmetric production profiles. For the use of the analysis, we first present the related definitions of concepts.
Definition 1 (Symmetric Production Profile).
A symmetric production profile ( )
Any strategy profile that is not a symmetric production profile belongs to asymmetric production profiles, which is correspondingly defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Asymmetric Production Profile
). An asymmetric production profile ( )
The analysis of equilibria in asymmetric production profiles is postponed to the next section.
Correspondingly, we can also define a stronger version of symmetric production profile where each user does not only produce the same amount of contents, but also has the same degree (i.e. the same number of friends to share contents with).
Definition 3 (Symmetric Profile). A symmetric profile ( )
x,g is a symmetric production profile which satisfies the property , ,
Symmetric profiles constitute a subset of symmetric production profiles. Therefore, a symmetric equilibrium, which is a symmetric profile satisfying (6) , is always a symmetric production equilibrium, which is a symmetric production profile satisfying (6) . Nevertheless, we could also prove in the following proposition that all users' degrees are also the same in a symmetric production equilibrium and hence, a symmetric production equilibrium, on the other hand, is also a symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In a symmetric production equilibrium
( )
Proof: See Appendix B. ■ Hence, in order to search for symmetric production equilibria, we only have to analyze symmetric profiles.
To facilitate our analysis, we define several concepts for a symmetric profile. First, we define an amount ( ) , , , 
, , , , , , ,
Additionally, we also define
, , , 1, , ,
It is obvious that two symmetric profiles having the same degree and production level provide users the same individual utility. Hence, these two symmetric profiles are regarded as being identical in realization and we have no preference on a particular one over the other. For illustration purposes, we use 
The following proposition proves that
other words, when a user deviates from a symmetric profile, the gain on his content utility from a new subscription monotonically decreases against his current degree. This is also consistent with the concavity of the benefit function (1). 
Proposition 2. Under a symmetric equilibrium with
(3) The following inequalities are satisfied ( )
and . Moreover, for each value of g , any two symmetric equilibria with different degrees cannot be equilibria at the same time.
Theorem 2. (1) For given v , c , and r , there is a non-empty region
(2) ( ) ( )
Proof: See Appendix B. ■
We now look at whether our results are consistent with the results in [14] with 1 r  . When r approaches 1, (10) becomes 5 We define ( ) [14] , which verifies that our model is a generalization of that in [14] .
We use the following exemplary benefit function
which satisfies Assumption (1) - (3) to illustrate
in Figure 1 . It should be noted that we take the value 10 n = only for the illustration purpose. The results in Figure 1 can be extended to an arbitrarily large n since symmetric equilibria are scalable. We take different values of r , which represents different levels of users' desire for content diversity. Particularly, in Figure 1 
, illustrates the fact that the equilibrium region for each degree except 0 and n-1 diminishes as r increases, i.e. when users have less desire for content diversity, which implies that to sustain a symmetric equilibrium becomes more difficult. When 1 r  , the feasible regions of g for all d except 0 d = and 1 d n = -disappear. This is consistent with the result in [14] as when contents become perfectly substitutable, there is no (strict) symmetric equilibrium except the following two: (1) the network is empty with no sharing between users, and each user produces the autarkic level x as defined in Lemma 2; and (2) a complete network where each user has the same production level and gets a total amount x of contents. 
C. Equilibria in asymmetric production profiles
In this section, we analyze the asymmetric production profiles as defined in Definition 2. An asymmetric equilibrium is thus defined as an asymmetric production profile that satisfies (6).
Without loss of generality, we order users by their production levels in an asymmetric production profile ( )
Since not all users produce the same amount of contents in this case, there is always a positive number h n n < , such that In Proposition 3, we characterize the asymmetric equilibria by summarizing their common properties.
These properties are helpful in understanding the structure of an asymmetric equilibrium and facilitating the following analysis.
In this section, we first characterize the basic properties for an asymmetric equilibrium. Proposition 3 characterize the linking behavior of an asymmetric equilibrium. Here we briefly explain Proposition 3. Statement (1) tells that there are at least two users in the network that are not friends with each other, which indicates that a network is always not a complete network in any asymmetric equilibrium. Statement (2) tells that each low producer subscribes to at least one high producer to acquire contents. Hence, users who produce more contents (e.g. celebrities and news agencies) are more favorable in an OSN. Statement (3) tells the fact that there does not exist an asymmetric equilibrium with a unique high producer. Therefore, the traditional star structure of content networks in which all users subscribe to a central news portal cannot be sustained. Statement (4) shows that a high producer do not subscribe any low producer but only acquire contents from other (if any) high producers. Hence, high producers play the role of influencers [13] in a network. Nevertheless, Statement (5) shows that each high producer does not connect with at least one other high producer in an asymmetric equilibrium. Therefore, high producers do not fully share contents among themselves, which leads to the content asymmetry among them.
Following Proposition 3, users' production behavior in an asymmetric equilibrium can be characterized in the following corollary. x  x ,g , which is the highest amount of contents produced by an individual user in the equilibrium. Therefore, the distribution of accessible contents in the network should be sufficiently balanced among users in order to sustain an equilibrium. In particular topologies where accessible contents are highly unbalanced among users, no equilibrium can be sustained.
To Proof: See Appendix C. ■ According to Proposition 3, high producers do not subscribe to low producers, whereas low producers always subscribe to some high producers. Hence, if a low producer does not subscribe to all high producers, he does not subscribe to any low producer as well. Summing up all these observations, we can conclude that there are three types of users in an asymmetric equilibrium, as summed up in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In any asymmetric equilibrium, each user belongs to one of the following three types:
(1) A high producer Proof: We have shown in Proposition 3 (4) and (5) the subscription behavior of high producers in an asymmetric equilibrium. For a low producer j who does not subscribe to any other low producer, he belongs to type (3). For a low producer j who subscribes to another low producer j ¢ , it is obvious that j subscribes to all high producers. Otherwise, j could strictly increase his utility by switching his subscription from j ¢ to a high producer h i n £ who he does not subscribe to. ■ Proposition 4 classifies users in an asymmetric equilibrium and characterizes their subscription behaviors, respectively. Depending on the production level of a high producer, i.e. the value of ( ) * *
x  x ,g , there could be multiple equilibria under the same network conditions. Figure 3 illustrates example equilibria in a network of 9 n = user when 0.8 r = , 0.1 c = , and 2 g = . As it shows, different equilibria with different production levels can emerge. In Figure 3 x  x ,g being large. As each low producer (marked green) can get sufficient contents from high producers, he does not subscribe to any other low producer. In this case, there are only two levels of content productions in the network. However in Figure 3 (b), with less (two) high producer (marked red) and a smaller value of ( ) * *
x  x ,g , each low producer cannot get sufficient contents from high producers and he also subscribes to other low producers, which leads to an equilibrium with three levels of content productions, where each user in green produces a medium amount of contents and each user in blue has the lowest production level and subscribes to all users whose production levels are higher than him.
( ) In contrast to the multiple production levels exhibited in Figure 3 , we prove in the following theorem, by taking the limit on the size of a network to infinity, that in an asymmetric equilibrium ( ) other. Therefore, all subscriptions in the network lead to high producers, which can be regarded as the major sources of contents in the network. The network then exhibits a flat structure with only two levels in its user hierarchy. We call the high producers as influencers and the low producers as subscribers whose main goal is to acquire contents from influencers. 
Proof: See Appendix C. ■
A key observation in the proof of Theorem 3 is that due to the cost of subscriptions, a user has to produce a sufficiently large amount of contents, which is lower-bounded away from 0, in order to attract others to subscribe to him. Meanwhile, a user has an upper bound on the amount of contents he would like to consume due to the concavity of the benefit function (1). As a result, a user also has an upper bound on the number of subscriptions he would like to maintain. Now as n  ¥ , the number of influencers also goes to infinity which provides enough contents for each user in the network to subscribe with. Hence, low producers will not mutually subscribe to each other but only subscribe to high producers.
Theorem 3 proves that the two-level structure is a necessary condition for an asymmetric equilibrium when n is sufficiently large, which is shown in Figure 4 with two examples of equilibrium topologies.
Both topologies exhibit the two-level structure composed of two rings. The inner ring represents the influencers that produce a large amount of contents, and the outer ring represents the subscribers that produce a small amount of contents. Influencers compose the center of the network, they do not subscribe to any subscriber, but they will mutually subscribe to each other in order to share contents among themselves. Subscribers, on the contrary, only subscribe to influencers but not to any other subscribers.
Hence, our results are consistent with the empirical observations that a majority of users in an OSN get most of their contents from a relatively small group of high producers. Also recall that there is only a limited region of g where symmetric equilibria exist and hence, asymmetric equilibria with the two-level structure are more likely to emerge in OSNs.
With the link cost increases, as shown in Figure 4 when g changes from 2 to 5, the network becomes sparse as in Figure 4 (b). Instead of subscribing to multiple influencers, subscribers only get contents from influencers from their vicinity and the network is divided into many small sub-networks where each influencer takes the charge of providing contents to his local users.
Examplary equilibria in an OSN with 100 n = users.
The influencer-subscriber structure exhibits some similarity to the small world networks. Nevertheless, different from the law of the few in [14] where there are a fixed number of influencers whose population size is independent on the network size. We further prove in the following theorem that the fraction of influencers in the population does not go to zero as n tends to infinity. This indicates that more influencers will emerge with the growth of the network, which is due to the content heterogeneity. As more users join the network, the content production which is monopolized by a small number of powerful influencers can no longer satisfy users' desire for diverse contents. As a result, new influencers with different varieties of contents should emerge to attract users and stabilize the network. However, when n is sufficiently large, the number of subscribers that an influencer can support reaches its upper bound as discussed in Theorem 3. Hence, to support an equilibrium, more influencers will emerge and h n n stops decreasing, which indicates that the number of influencers starts to grow proportionally with n . Figure 5 (b) shows how the production levels of influencers and subscribers change against n . For a better illustration, we plot the normalized production levels which are compared
with their values at 100 n = on each curve. As it shows, the normalized production level of subscribers drops more drastically than that of influencers as the network size grows, since a subscriber mainly relies on the contents acquired from others rather than self-production. Figure 5 (a) The fraction of influencers changing against n ; (b) The normalized production levels of users changing against n .
Before ending this section, we further provide some characterization on the influencer-subscriber structure.
Corollary 3. (1)In the influencer-subscriber structure, the utility received by an influencer is always higher than the utility received by a subscriber. (2) An influencer always maintains fewer subscriptions than a subscriber.
Proof: See Appendix C. ■
IV. SOCIAL OPTIMUM AND PRICING SCHEME
We now study the social optimum of the PNF game. The social welfare of a network is defined to be the sum of users' individual utilities. For a profile ( ) , x g , the social welfare is given by
First, we prove that the social optimum can be achieved by a symmetric profile. 
The social optimum is the solution of the following problem:
. . 0 0,1, , 1
which can be solved sequentially by two steps. In the first step, we derive the optimal production level for
It is the solution of the following equation:
In the second step, we optimize over all symmetric profiles
d then constitutes the optimal strategy profile that achieves the social optimum.
Denote a user's content utility as follows for convenience
we prove that as d increases, the change on 
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and is omitted here. ■
In order to sustain
as an equilibrium, we propose a pricing scheme where users have to pay extra fees for subscriptions and the acquired contents from their friends. The pricing scheme is flatrate such that each user pays a constant fee t for each subscription and a constant fee p for unit content acquired. It should be noted that different from g that is paid to the service provider of the network, both t and p are paid directly to the user who is being subscribed. Meanwhile, t and p are not necessarily positive. If t or p is negative, it means that a user should be granted with some reward for creating subscriptions in order to improve the content sharing efficiency in the network. With the pricing scheme, a user i 's utility becomes
Recall that the purpose of the pricing scheme is to sustain
to be an equilibrium, we have to ensure that the user's marginal benefit of production equals to c , i.e.
( ) ( ) ( )
Meanwhile, in order to enforce a user to maintain # d friends, we have to ensure that the maximum gain (minimum loss) on the content utility that a user of the degree 
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and is omitted here. ■ Figure 6 plots how the optimal prices change against the link cost g 7 . When g is small, users prefer to acquire contents from others rather than self-production, due to the low cost of content transmission. At this stage, high prices for subscriptions and content acquisitions should be set in order to increase users' production levels. Nevertheless, as g increases, users tend to produce contents by themselves and the content sharing level in the network becomes low. In this case, both p and t should be reduced in order to encourage content sharing. As Figure 6 (b) shows, when g is too large, # t becomes negative, which implies that a user should be compensated in his subscription to cover his link cost. 7 Since there is a range of applicable # t for each value of g according to Error! Reference source not found., we take the median of this range in the plot. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we investigate the problem of network formation in OSNs. Different from the existing literature, the users' incentives for producing contents themselves and for creating links to consume the contents produced by other are jointly considered. Moreover, we determine rigorously how the users' desire for heterogeneous contents impacts on the users' interactions. Using a game-theoretic analysis, we
show that as the size of the OSN grows, every (strict) non-cooperative equilibrium is composed of either a symmetric topology or a two-level hierarchical topology where the number of influencers grows proportionally with the network size. The social optimum can be achieved in a symmetric topology, and we design a pricing scheme to achieve it in a non-cooperative equilibrium. Our analysis can be extended in several directions, among which we mention two. First, users in an OSN do not necessarily need to be homogeneous as discussed in this paper. Different users might perceive contents differently by having different benefit functions. Second, alternative models on content transmission and subscription can be adopted. For instance, user subscriptions are free on Twitter while the content transmission on an established link is unilateral (i.e. a user being followed cannot acquire contents shared by his followers.).
Moreover, network formation with indirect content transmission also forms an important future direction, where content of users who are not directly connected can also be shared. 
2) Proof of Lemma 3
Due to Assumption (3), user i 's marginal benefit of production monotonically decreases with the amount of contents he acquires from others. Hence, user i has the largest marginal benefit of production,
i.e. the largest incentive to produce content, at every point of i x when he acquires no content from others,
i.e.
The corresponding utility function for user i can be rewritten as
He stops producing new contents when the marginal benefit of production equals to the marginal cost, i.e. 
However, according to Assumption (3), we should have ( ) ( ) * * * * , ,
i j e x X e x X < since user i acquires more contents from others than user j and hence, there is a contradiction and the assumption that ( ) ( )
g does not hold in a symmetric production equilibrium. Therefore, Proposition 1 follows.
■
4) Proof of Lemma 4
Using the equilibrium condition, we have that
Now consider an arbitrary value of d . According to Assumption (3), the following inequality holds:
Regarding the fact that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
1, , , , , , It should be noted that the second inequality of (32) relies on the fact that
Using a similar argument as Lemma 4, we have that ( ) ( ) 
6) Proof of Theorem 1
Statements (1) and (2) are obvious and hence, we only prove Statement (3) here.
First we consider the case that We then consider the case that (1) To prove this, we only need to show that ( ) ( )
That is, 
To prove
This can be proved using a similar approach as Lemma 4. The detailed computation is omitted here due to the space limitation. ■ Appendix C
1) Proof of Proposition 3
(1) Suppose the network is complete with 
However, since
, it can be concluded that = " ¹ . Suppose user j receives a link from user j ¢ , then it must be the case that user h n is also the neighbor of user j ¢ . Otherwise j ¢ can strictly increase his utility by switching the link from j to h n .
This implies that every user who establishes a link with user j is also a neighbor of user h n . Regarding the fact that user j only receives subscriptions and does not subscribe to any other, he acquires from his neighbors at most as much contents as user h n does. Since a user's marginal utility of information production monotonically decreases against the amount of contents he acquires from his neighbors, we can conclude that Therefore, every friend of user j is also a friend of user i and thus user i acquires more contents than user j . We have that 
When
3 n = , the line also forms a star topology and hence cannot be sustained according to Statement (1).
When 5 n ³ , it is obvious that the perceived amount of information that user 1 n -acquires is strictly lower than user 3 n -. Hence, * 1 n x -is strictly higher than * 3 n x -. Since user 1 n -is only connected with user 3 n -which is not a user with the highest information production, we should have * 1 n x -being the highest amount of information production according to Proposition 3 (2).
If
5 n = , we should have
x -= since user 1 is connected to neither user 1 n -nor user n .
Hence, the perceived amount of contents of user 1 is strictly higher than user 1 n -, which contradicts the fact that
. Therefore, the line cannot be sustained in equilibrium. The first case does not hold due to the same reason as in the scenario when 5 n = . In the second case, we have the perceived amount of contents that user 5 n -acquires equals to that of user 3 n -and hence g --= without loss of generality. As a result, user 3 n -can strictly increases his utility if he switches the subscription from user 5 n -to user { } max 7,1 n -, which contradicts the equilibrium property. Therefore, the line cannot be sustained in equilibrium and Statement (2) follows. ■
4) Proof of Theorem 3
For illustration purposes, let l h n n n = -denote the population of low producers. Since each low producer subscribes to at least one high producer, we should have the following inequality as ( ) ( )
in order to sustain a low producer's incentive to create a link. Hence, x  is lower bounded as follows:
For any value of ( ) 
Consequently, a low producer has no incentive to subscribe to more than h L high producers, and there are only two situations that will possibly emerge when n  ¥ :
(1) The number of high producers remains finite, i.e. h n < ¥ when n  ¥ .
(2) h n goes to infinity when n  ¥ and there is no low producer who subscribes to other low producers. Alternatively speaking, each low producer only subscribes to high producers.
To analyze the first scenario, we further classify low producers described in Proposition 4 into the following classes:
(a) A low producer who only subscribes to high producers and is not subscribed by other low producers;
(b) A low producer who only subscribes with high producers and is also subscribed by other low producers;
(c) A low producer who subscribes to all high producers and some low producers.
For notational convenience, the population sizes of the above three classes are denoted as la n , lb n , and lc n , respectively. It is obvious that production level of a low producer of type (a) is bounded away from 0 since the total amount of contents he acquires will not exceed a finite amount h n x . If la n goes to infinity, there is at least one high producer being subscribed by an infinite amount of users of type (a). Hence, the amount of contents produced by this high producer should go arbitrarily close to 0, which leads to a contradiction to (37). As a result, it can be concluded that la n is finite when n  ¥ . Now consider a low producer j who belongs to type (b). Let * j x denote his production level and we should also have * j x satisfying (37). Otherwise, no user has the incentive to subscribe to him. Using the same argument as that for type (a), it can be concluded that lb n is also finite when n  ¥ .
